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“Pulled Apart, Pushed Together”
Diversity and Unity within the Congress of






This is a study of horizontal and vertical solidarity within 
a national labour movement, based on a nationwide survey of 
members of affiliated unions of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions. On the one hand, the survey reveals relatively high 
levels of vertical and horizontal solidarity, despite the persistence 
of some cleavages on gender and racial lines. On the other hand, 
the maintenance and deepening of existing horizontal and vertical 
linkages in a rapidly changing socio-economic context, represents 
one of many challenges facing organized labour in an industrial-
izing economy. COSATU’s strength is contingent not only on an 
effective organizational capacity, and a supportive network linking 
key actors and interest groupings, but also on the ability to meet 
the concerns of existing constituencies and those assigned to highly 
marginalized categories of labour.
This is a study of horizontal and vertical linkages within a national 
labour movement, based on a survey of members of affiliated unions of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The South African 
labour movement has been seen as one of the most effective worldwide 
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and a cornerstone of this strength has been its internal solidarity. However, 
this solidarity may, more recently, be under pressure from changes in the 
wider economy: from new managerial strategies externally and from the 
need to reconcile the competing demands of different interest groupings 
within the movement. Both the relative strength of the South African labour 
movement, and the challenges it faces, hold important lessons for unions 
operating in other contexts: the South African experience underscores the 
importance of organizing and solidarity, and the problems and possibilities 
of outreach.
Outside South Africa, unions have had to contend with twenty years of 
unprecedented external and internal pressures resulting in falling member-
ship, as Table 1 shows.
TABLE 1
Union Density in Selected Countries
Country Union density (%) Union density 
growth (%)
Rank order of union 
density
1985 1995 1985–95 1985 1995
Australia 46 33 –28  2  4
Canada 35 35   0  6  3
France 15 11 –27  9 10
Germany 36 30 –16  5  5
Italy 42 38 –10  4  2
Japan 29 24 –18  7  7
Korea 12 14  +2 10  9
Sweden 86 83  –2  1  1
UK 45 29 –35  3  6
USA 18 15 –12  8  8
ILO data, cited in Bamber and Lansbury (1998: 359).
Externally, unions have faced a range of forces generally associated 
with a process of “globalization”: the integration of financial markets and 
shifts in consumer taste, rapid technological advance, increased interna-
tional competition, and reductions in the willingness and ability of national 
governments to intervene in ameliorating market forces (Cerny 2003: 
85–89). Meanwhile internal pressures include increasingly diverse 
 workforces and less secure employment contracts, particularly in those 
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 Anglo-Saxon countries that have been removing restrictions on employer 
liability labour market policies in the name of “flexibility.”
Union decline has long been debated, in terms of causes, whether 
such decline is long-term or cyclical, and the appropriateness of various 
approaches that might constitute an appropriate renewal strategy. The 
problem is principally due to there being no obvious single cause of union 
decline. Thus, while the impact of overtly anti-union governments may well 
have contributed to union decline in, say, Britain (Brown, Deakin and Ryan 
1997; MacInnes 1987; Martin et al. 1995), it would not explain decline 
elsewhere (France, Australia). In the wider context of economic policy, 
union decline has also been attributed solely to the economic restructuring 
of the economy (financial and employment deregulation, and privatization), 
within an increasingly adverse global environment (Wood and Brewster 
2002). However, whilst there is little doubt that the intensification of global 
competition, overproduction, and changes in consumer demand and taste 
have placed firms under considerable pressure—encouraging the adoption 
of labour repressive policies—the effects of “globalization” have not been 
uniform (Block 2003: 440–451). For example, union membership trends 
remain uneven within continental Europe (Hyman 2001a), have remained 
relatively resilient in Canada, and have witnessed some growth in a number 
of developing nations—despite, in the latter two cases, the deregulatory 
drive being very much in the Anglo-Saxon mould. In short, while a range 
of external forces have put unions under great pressure, labour movements 
in some national contexts seem to have been more successful in mitigat-
ing these forces than in others. In particular, labour unions remain strong 
and internally vibrant in a number of semi-industrialized/industrializing 
countries (Jose 2002). The latter would include Brazil, South Korea, the 
Philippines, and South Africa. The question, here, is what holds unions 
together in such circumstances.
Frost (2000) argues that the ability of unions to cope with changes in the 
external environment and the resultant managerial strategies are contingent 
on union capabilities. In turn, union capability is contingent upon horizontal 
and vertical linkages (Frost 2000: 562). In this sense, the labour “movement” 
could be considered to be a network of relations between actors, with its 
fortunes contingent on the strength and nature of internal contacts and ties 
(Walsh 1994; Frost 2000). Vertical linkages concern the ability of unions 
not only to educate and mobilize the rank-and-file, and the responsiveness 
of leadership to the concerns of members, but also the state of ties between 
local and national union structures, and the union and the relevant national 
and international federations; this allows for more effective mobilization, 
joint action, and information sharing. Horizontal links are those between 
different unions, social coalitions and community groupings; the nature 
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and strength of these ties partially determines the capacity for collective 
action, good ties making for more effective joint campaigning and resource 
distribution (Frost 2000: 561–562; Walsh 1994: 5–8).
Locke (1992), from a study of restructuring in the Italian auto indus-
try, argues that the uneven fortunes of unions between and within nations 
reflects external pressures, local conditions and the manner in which unions 
balance national and local priorities. The adoption of new managerial strat-
egies and forms of work organization at enterprise level has forced local 
unions to experiment with new forms of bargaining and accommodation, 
leading to a proliferation of practices that may challenge national union pri-
orities. Conversely, the need to reach accommodations with political parties 
has the potential to conflict with workplace level needs and rank and file 
priorities (James 2004) and national unions may discount the concerns of 
local groupings of workers under such circumstances (Locke 1992: 245).
In the case of South Africa, as Table 2 illustrates, unions have 
retained—indeed have expanded – their penetration in the labour market, 
during the period of decline elsewhere.
TABLE 2










In part, COSATU has owed its strength to a legislative dispensation 
that has been relatively labour-friendly, and to the legitimacy accrued from 
playing a central role in opposing the apartheid regime during its closing 
years. However, COSATU’s strength has also been due to its  ability to 
accommodate and meet the needs of a relatively diverse membership, 
 straddling gender and racial divides. South Africa’s economy shares 
attributes in common with both the developed and the developing world. 
In few other contexts have the pressures facing organized labour been so 
great: the need to accommodate the intensification of global competition, 
the challenges of dealing with new managerial strategies at plant level, the 
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legacies of entrenched racism both within the workplace and wider society, 
and the complexities of dealing with a political partner increasingly under 
the thrall of neo-liberalism whilst battling to accommodate the needs of 
different constituencies. At the same time, unions need to overcome the 
challenges posed by regional socio-economic variations, differing politi-
cal traditions, and the need to be relevant to the concerns of the growing 
numbers of workers in peripheral categories of labour. The extent to which 
the South African labour movement has been able to cope, and prosper, in 
such an adverse environment holds important lessons for organized labour 
worldwide.
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL LINKAGES IN SOUTH 
 AFRICAN LABOUR
During the apartheid era, the political exclusion of Africans was 
 mirrored at the workplace by “racial fordism,” characterized by a rigid 
racial division of labour (Joffee at al. 1993; Webster 1987). Prior to the 
1970s, attempts to organize African workers through periodic upsurges 
in service organizations generally proved short-lived. However, by 1985, 
through a gradual process of mergers, the bulk of the South African labour 
movement coalesced into industrial unions under the umbrella of COSATU. 
In the twilight of apartheid, COSATU played a central role in the internal 
mass-based opposition, fulfilling the role of a social movement. The  ending 
of apartheid saw COSATU entering a formal alliance with the recently 
“unbanned” African National Congress (ANC), and its junior partner, the 
South African Communist Party (SACP).
Horizontal Linkages: Dealing with Diversity
A range of union responses to the “hard times” of the early 2000s 
have been proposed and debated over recent years. This has ranged from 
paying greater attention to the “servicing” of individual members’ needs; 
to promoting mergers in order to benefit from economies of scale; to 
rediscovering the benefits of active recruitment and representation of under-
organized groupings—the “organizing” approach; to the promotion of new 
“partnerships” with management; and to the promotion of a broader role 
in promoting social upliftment (Hyman 2001b; Claydon 1998; Fairbrother 
2000; Kochan and Osterman 1994; McIlroy 2000).
Apart from “partnership,” COSATU unions have been relatively 
active in all of these initiatives. COSATU has generally been successful 
in its policy of one-industry, one-union, and has also experienced some 
expansion into the less organized sectors (Wood 1997). Finally, COSATU 
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has  successfully reconstituted its role as a social movement and remains 
committed to the principles of militant organization (Wood and Psoulis 
2001: 310).
However, the question emerges as to the extent to which such activities 
are mutually reinforcing or contradictory. To Hyman (2001b), it is often the 
latter: the pursuit of a social partner role can often erode broader worker 
solidarity. Conversely, Kochan et al. (2001) argue that a mix of strategies 
may be complementary, tailored to attract, organize and retain different 
groupings of workers, whilst building coalitions with community group-
ings and other labour friendly groupings. Such co-operation is, of course, 
easier if workers in different unions and sectors have similar aspirations and 
concerns, and similar attitudes towards organizational activities, regardless 
of whether the union is emerging or mature. This would highlight the need 
to test sectoral variables, above all between sectors where partnerships with 
management are advanced, and those where union organization is relatively 
recent and associated with a high degree of militancy.
Successfully maintaining internal cohesion while remaining externally 
effective is a key issue. To Kochan et al. (2001), union effectiveness in 
today’s world is about being able to appeal to a diverse membership and 
potential membership categories, straddling different sectors, demographic 
categories, and skill levels. In other words, it is about effective horizontal 
linkages. All of this is only achievable if unions fulfil the role of a popular 
movement, able to make a meaningful impact in the battle for ideas.
The internal challenges facing unions include that of being relevant 
to increasingly diverse constituencies and dealing with changes in work 
organization, employment contracts, and societal and generational changes 
(Hyman 2001b; Kelly 1998; Moody 1997). The potential cleavages identi-
fied by the wide range of authors mentioned, as likely to pose specific chal-
lenges to unions are, then, diversities of age/generation, gender, ethnicity, 
sector, occupation, and socio-cultural group.
Contingent on it being able to make a worthwhile case in the “battle 
for ideas,” the actual effectiveness of a union may be gauged by member-
ship coverage, capacity to mobilize for collective action and the extent of 
participation in the internal life of the union (Hyman 2001b; Kelly 1998; 
Heery et al. 2000).
Vertical Linkages: The Nature and Extent of a Democratic 
 Rupture
Political alliances are always a fraught business for unions. Invariably, 
unions have to trade off influence for a loss of independence (Regini 1984). 
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No alliances can mean marginalization, particularly in a multi-party democ-
racy. As noted earlier, COSATU is in a formal alliance with South Africa’s 
ruling ANC. On the one hand, this has facilitated in the promulgation of a 
body of legislation that is some of the most labour-friendly in the world. On 
the other hand, COSATU has proved unable to check the ANC’s gradual 
drift rightwards, marked by the adoption of the neo-liberal GEAR (Growth, 
Empowerment and Redistribution) macro-economic policy framework. 
Critics of the federation’s current stance of “strategic engagement” are 
based either on the view that COSATU is acting as a “selfish elite” or that 
it has sold its members short by being incorporated into an anti union/anti 
working class agenda.
The “selfish elite” critique of COSATU is based around the familiar 
conservative view that the federation represents a privileged grouping of 
labour market insiders, pursuing their interests regardless of the long term 
employment consequences (Olson 1982). In South Africa, this critique is 
taken up by some who brand the alleged over-use of the strike weapon 
as being detrimental to COSATU members and to the most marginalized 
members of society (Baskin 1991; Habib and Taylor 1999). Further criti-
cisms also focus on the inefficient running of COSATU, with its members 
representing a radical “labour aristocracy” who are barely held in check by 
moderate leaders (Adam and Moodley 1993; Etherington 1992).
The “sell-out” critique is equal-but-opposite to that of the selfish elite 
critique. While trade union identity, in most national contexts, has centred 
on an ideology of class struggle, in the case of COSATU, issues of class 
contestation have been diluted by the exigencies of national liberation 
(Regini 1984: 134). This led to protracted debates at COSATU Congresses 
as to the relative importance of developing an explicitly socialist policy 
manifesto, and the nature and extent of relations with the ANC (Baskin 
1991: 280; Ramaphosa 1985: 45). The formal ending of apartheid with 
the election of the ANC government in 1994 brought this debate further 
to the fore. Thus, opponents of COSATU’s alliance with the ANC argue 
that COSATU’s influence on the ANC has progressively waned (Habib 
and Taylor 1999).
It is further argued that union leadership has become tied to both 
the state and sections of capital through a proliferation of complex deals 
 covering issues ranging from productivity and profit sharing to social 
policy (Murray and Wood 1997: 167). This relationship between senior 
union figures and the ANC resulted in discontentment amongst the rank-
and-file and an increasing sense of being marginalized. These tensions 
have been exacerbated by the desire of national union leaders to reach 
strategic  accommodations with employer associations, and the differing 
needs of grassroots constituencies, mobilizing in response to specific local 
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managerial strategies and actions (Locke 1992; Frost 2000). However, 
Barchiesi (1999) and Rachleff (2001) argue that instead of union members 
being dissatisfied with the COSATU leadership, discontent has centred on 
a more conspicuous target: the alliance with the increasingly neo-liberal 
ANC: “The unions, tied to COSATU, which in turn has been tied to the 
ANC […], have been little able to articulate an alternative economic agenda, 
despite their once outspoken advocacy of a grassroots activism” (Rachleff 
2001: 162–163).
For different reasons, then, critiques of COSATU’s current direction state 
that its leadership is pursuing policies against the wider interests of its con-
stituent membership. In order to test the extent of a vertical rupture between 
rank-and-file and leadership, we assess the opinions of different categories of 
member towards the Alliance with the ANC. An analysis of COSATU union 
members’ views on specific issues relating to horizontal and vertical ruptures 
was conducted in order to identify the basis of any emerging cleavages. To 
this end, an analysis of responses to questions about members’ propensity to 
strike was used to identify the extent to which the COSATU leadership may 
be acting as a “selfish elite.” Also, an analysis of members’ stated intention 
to vote for the ANC was used to identify the extent to which support for the 
tripartite alliance was waning, thus vindicating the “sell-out” critique.
METHODOLOGY
This study is based on a nation-wide survey conducted in 1998 amongst 
rank-and-file members of COSATU affiliated unions, replicating similar 
studies conducted in 1994 and 1992 (Ginsburg et al. 1995). As with its 
predecessors, the 1998 survey explored the nature of worker organization 
and the attitudes and expectations of members towards both parliamentary 
and workplace democracy.
The study was conducted with the support of COSATU and the co-
operation of employers; this and the fact that the interviews were conducted 
on a face-to-face basis allowed for an extremely high response rate, with 
very few potential respondents declining to be interviewed. The sample used 
was multi-layered and area based and provided 646 respondents. The final 
sample size and format of the questionnaire were based on detailed pilot 
studies in each area.1 As an accurate list of trade union members was not 
available, final sampling was done systematically at individual  workplaces, 
1. The only region where some problems of access were encountered was in KwaZulu-Natal, 
where ANC-IFP rivalry has been reflected in contestations between COSATU and IFP 
union wing, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). However, this only 
affected a small minority of workplaces in the survey.
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the number of workers selected being in proportion to the firm’s overall 
workforce size. This precluded the over-representation of workers from 
smaller firms. The advantage of such a method is that the sample is  compiled 
during the interviewing process (Bailey 1982).
In order to more formally test for unification/ruptures within COSATU, 
the propensity to undertake strike action was used as an indicator of hori-
zontal solidarity, and support for the ANC was used to indicate vertical 
solidarity. In both cases, behavioural differences across regions, occupa-
tions, gender, and racial group are explored. Thus once these factors are 
controlled for, hypotheses can be tested, with any significant cross-union 
differences in the likelihood of industrial action and the level of ANC sup-
port indicating the presence of internal and external ruptures respectively.
The empirical analysis presents the data both in summary tabular form 
and produces binary probit models so that the effect of specific factors 
(noted below) can be compared to each other. The models created estimate 
the probability of a specific outcome as a function of the variables deemed 
to influence that outcome, and are of the form:
z = ˆβ' x + ε, where ε ∼ N (0,1)   (1)
y = 1 if z > 0, and y = 0 if z ≥ 0,
where z reflects the probability of a particular outcome, x is the vector of 
explanatory variables and β their estimated coefficients, with y being the 
dependent variable. In this analysis, the dependent variable takes the value 
1 if strike action has taken place and 0 otherwise in the first instance, then 
1 if the respondent intends voting for the ANC and 0 otherwise for the 
second model.
For simplicity, the largest group in each category is used as a dummy 
variable. Together they make up the base model, which is a male, semi-
skilled, Isizulu speaking, STD6 educated (the benchmark level of education 
at age 14), National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) member who resides 
in Gauteng. A general to specific  methodology is adopted where, for clarity, 
insignificant variables are dropped from the analysis.
For model 1 the likely determinants of strike action are: the trade union 
organization the worker is a member of, region, age, education, occupation, 
gender and whether a shop steward is present in the workplace and if so, 
whether the steward is elected by fellow union members. The hypothesis is 
that no differences in militancy exist within COSATU, with any deviation 
from this indicating a rupture. Any significant coefficients on the trade union 
dummy variables will indicate such a rupture, with the greater frequency 
of significant terms in the model indicating a greater problem. The shop 
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steward variable is expected to be positive, with the elected shop steward 
variable also expected to be positive since his/her position is determined 
by fellow workers.2 Trade union members of certain occupational groups 
may be more/less likely to undertake strike action in accordance with their 
role within the firm (e.g., supervisor and unskilled worker).
Finally, a probit model is used for identifying the allegiance of 
COSATU members to the ANC, with any significant explanatory variables 
again providing evidence of divergence within COSATU. The model uses 
the same explanatory variables as the previous one. Therefore, it seeks to 
explain voting behaviour as a function of region, age, education, occupation, 
gender, union and its presence within the workplace. This analysis will allow 
the diversity and unity within COSATU to be tested across different trade 
union workers whether by fixed “indices” (e.g., gender), variable indices 
(e.g., membership of a specific union), or region of residency.3
FINDINGS
The findings present the results of the probit models described above. 
Overall the indicators of vertical or horizontal rupture (defined by support for 
the Alliance and propensity to strike, respectively) demonstrate high levels 
of solidarity among union members. Thus, 420 respondents—some 68% of 
those interviewed—had taken part in strike action within the previous four 
years and support for the Alliance is overwhelming, as Table 3 shows.
TABLE 3




(The Alliance) is the best way of serving workers’ interests 
in parliament 446 70
Worker interests in parliament should be represented by 
the SACP alone  22  3.5
COSATU should not be aligned with any political party  85 13.5
Another party could better serve worker interests   6 1
Workers should form their own political party  22  3.5
Don’t know  55  8.5
2. The principal economic model of trade union behaviour used is based on Ashenfelter 
(1973), with trade union power coming from members, with the power of leaders/ 
spokespersons at every level determined by the “ ‘rank and file’.”
3. Probit models were also undertaken for different age cohorts and occupational groups, 
but are not reported here due to space restrictions.
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However, within this picture of solidarity, the probit models indicate 
some diversity. The first model tests vertical solidarity by comparing  factors 
(discussed in the methodology section, above) affecting the likelihood of trade 
union members having undertaken strike action. The dependent variable takes 
the value of 1 if an individual has been involved in strike action and 0 if they 
have not. The results for this model are presented in Table 4.
TABLE 4
Likelihood of Trade Union Members taking Industrial Action,
1994–1998 (Probit)
Variable Coefficient t-test Mean Marginal Effects
Constant –0.29 –0.7 1 –0.10
Eastern Cape –0.31 –2.1 0.257 –0.11
Supervisor –0.41 –1.6 0.049 –0.16
None –0.95 –2.5 0.025 –0.37
NEHAWU –1.36 –7.2 0.119 –0.50
NUM –0.96 –4.2 0.065 –0.37
CWIU  0.64  2.9 0.157 0.2 
SACCAWU –0.75 –3.5 0.078 –0.29
CAWU –2.04 –3.8 0.019 –0.64
PPWAWU –0.62 –2.7 0.064 –0.24
SACTWU –0.54 –3.2 0.149 –0.20
Tsonga –0.80 –1.8 0.064 –0.31
Shop Steward 1.29  3.3 0.973  0.48
Mean dependent variable: 0.6619. Observations: 630. Chi-squared: 154.5. 
Log likelihood (LL): -325.79. Restricted LL: -403.05.
Here, then, membership of a particular union has some significance as 
to the likelihood of strike action taking place, but region, language, occupa-
tion or education do not. Since the probit model is not a linear function, the 
coefficients are not the effect of a unit change in that explanatory variable, 
so for clarity the marginal effects are also reported. These marginal effects 
are the derivative of the probability function which estimates the slope of 
that function at each point and can be interpreted as the average effect of a 
unit change in that variable (Greene 2000). So, for example, Table 4 indi-
cates that those living in the Eastern Cape are 11% less likely to have taken 
industrial action than comparable workers in the base group of Gauteng 
and that members of NEHAWU are 50% less likely than members of the 
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reference category NUMSA. In terms of region, and education, only those 
workers from the Eastern Cape and/or employed as a supervisor and/or 
with no formal education are less likely to undertake strike action, these 
being 11%, 16% and 37% respectively. In terms of language, members 
who speak Tsonga are less likely (31%) to strike than Isizulu speaking 
union workers.
The presence of a shop steward in the place of work significantly 
increases the probability of industrial action by 48%. The key findings, 
though, are that membership of particular unions affects the likelihood 
of striking. There are 15 unions included in the sample. When controlled 
for age, education, region, etc., seven are significantly different from the 
base group in terms of the likelihood of strike action, and seven are not. 
Of those with a significant difference, most appear more averse to strike 
action, indicated by the negative coefficients, than the base group NUMSA. 
The exception to this is the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) 
who is 20% more likely. This would probably reflect the introduction 
of centralized bargaining in that industry, which has resulted in periodic 
localized protests by sectional interests discontented with national-level 
deals reached. In addition, the chemical industry is one of the few sectors 
where a COSATU affiliate is not the dominant union. In this area, the ideo-
logically Africanist, and rather smaller, National Council of Trade Unions’ 
(NACTU) and the South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU) enjoy 
a  substantial following.
Workers are far more likely to strike if there are functional shop  steward 
structures present, which would reflect a high mobilizing capacity on the 
part of the union (Batstone 1988; Batsone, Boraston and Frenkel 1978; 
Crouch 1982).
Differences in Political Voting Behaviour: The General Case
The results for the likelihood of voting for the African National 
Congress in the 1999 general elections are reported in Table 5.
Overall 75% of those surveyed expressed an intention to vote for the 
ANC. Once again, any significant variation from the dummy variables 
suggests that, once the model has been controlled for the other explanatory 
factors, membership of a specific union is likely to cause the probability of 
voting ANC to differ from the sample mean, indicating a potential rupture. 
Union members in the Western Cape are 9% more likely to vote for the 
ANC than are those in the base group, Gauteng. The education dummies 
were insignificant with regard to affecting the voting behaviour of union 
members, and were dropped. Those union workers whose first language is 
either English or Afrikaans are less likely to vote for the ANC than union 
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members whose “mother-tongue” is an African language (the base group), 
indicated by the negative coefficients observed, both being in the region 
of 51%. Within COSATU these union members would most likely be 
coloured (persons of mixed racial origin). This finding is consistent with 
actual  election results in 1999 that found that the majority of “coloured” 
workers voted for the New National Party, the former party of apartheid. 
Few opted for more radical alternatives to the ANC in 1999 such as the 
Socialist party of Azania or the Azanian Peoples Organization.
TABLE 5
Likelihood of Trade Union Members voting for the ANC in 1999 (Probit)
Variable Coefficient t-test Mean Marginal Effects
Constant –0.48 –2.2 –0.14
Western Cape  0.37  1.7 0.206  0.09
English –1.41 –6.1  0.1100 –0.51
Afrikaans –1.44 –6.2  0.1400 –0.51
Elected Shop Steward  0.94  4.5 0.921  0.33
Better Housing since 1994  0.75  5.9 0.551  0.22
Better Healthcare, since 1994  0.36  2.8 0.638  0.11
NUMSA  0.48  2.8 0.191  0.12
SACCAWU –0.61 –2.8 0.077 –0.21
Mean dependent variable: 0.7456. Observations: 625. Chi-squared: 164.86.
Log likelihood (LL): -272.02. Restricted LL: -354.45.
All trade union dummies were included in the regression model, with 
only the significant variables shown here. The election of a shop steward 
positively affects the likelihood of union members voting for the ANC 
(33%), reflecting the new democratic process in South Africa since 1994. 
The interesting finding here is that a rupture appears to exist between 
NUMSA and the South African Combined Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) members regarding their allegiance to the ANC and 
the alliance. Whilst NUMSA members are 12% more likely to vote ANC 
than the base group, CWIU, SACCAWU members are 21% less likely to 
vote ANC than the CWIU. This may indicate a horizontal rupture within 
COSATU across skills groups regarding support for the ANC party, and 
represents a potential source for a vertical rupture for the tripartite alliance if 
SACCAWU members gain support. These findings are surprising. NUMSA 
is recognized as a left-wing union who would perhaps be less likely to 
support the ANC than other unions within COSATU (Habib and Taylor 
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1999). A possible reason for this finding is a lack of alternative left-wing 
political parties for NUMSA members to vote for in the 1999 elections. 
With regard to the findings for SACCAWU, evidence from Baskin (1991) 
indicates that there is evidence of long-term division within this union and 
all its precursors. In addition, SACCAWU incorporates significant numbers 
of non-African members. Other union dummies were included in the model 
but whilst they were all positive, the coefficients were not significant at 
the 10% level.
Finally, the 1998 questionnaire asks a series of questions about 
improvements in life since 1994, and these were added into the model to 
see if they had any impact on trade union members’ propensity to vote for 
the ANC. Table 5 illustrates that improved housing and improved access 
to healthcare all positively affect the likelihood of voting for the ANC in 
1999, being 22% and 11% respectively.
Gender Differences in Political Voting Behaviour
Having undertaken the basic analysis for both male and female union 
members, gender specific analysis was next undertaken to see if differences 
across gender exist. The results in Table 6 are for female union workers 
only, indicating that 62% intended voting for the ANC. Those whose first 
language is English or Afrikaans are, again, less likely to vote for the ANC, 
34 and 32% respectively, than union members whose “mother-tongue” is 
Isixhosa, a finding consistent with a horizontal rupture.
TABLE 6
Likelihood of Female Trade Union Members voting for the ANC in 1999 
(Probit)
Variable Coefficient t-test Mean Marginal Effects
Constant –0.99 –2.8 –0.37
English –0.88 –2.7 0.125 –0.34
Afrikaans –0.84 –3.2 0.201 –0.32
Elected  1.10  3.3 0.891  0.42
Better Housing since 1994?  0.66   3 0.543  0.24
Better healthcare since 1994?  0.59  2.6 0.658  0.22
SACCAWU –0.70 –2.2 0.114 –0.27
Mean dependent variable: 0.6196. Observations: 184. Chi-squared: 50.8. 
Log likelihood (LL): –96.8. Restricted LL: –122.2.
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Of particular interest is the importance of the questions regarding public 
services and access to them since 1994. As with the all-sample analysis, 
the access to better housing since 1994 is more likely to result in voting for 
the ANC in 1999 (24%), with this also being the case for access to better 
healthcare (22%). The presence of an elected shop steward in the workplace 
positively affects the likelihood of COSATU members voting for the ANC, 
indicating their importance to COSATU and the tripartite alliance in dis-
seminating information. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the position 
of SACCAWU members with regard to affiliation to the ANC. As in Table 
5, SACCAWU members are less likely to vote for the ANC than CWIU 
members, potentially indicating a horizontal rupture across both gender 
and skills, again with potential implications for vertical rupture. However, 
when compared with the male results in Table 7, it appears that the division 
between male and female is within SACCAWU itself (Baskin 1991).
TABLE 7
Likelihood of Male Trade Union Members voting for the ANC in 1999 
(Probit)
Variable Coefficient t-test Mean Marginal Effects
Constant  0.15  0.5  0.03
Supervisor –0.74 –2.1 0.045 –0.22
Isizulu –0.58 –2.8 0.256 –0.15
English –1.52 –5.9 0.093 –0.51
Afrikaans –1.62 –6.8 0.106 –0.54
Elected  0.83  2.9 0.932  0.25
Better housing since 1994?  0.75  4.5 0.567  0.17
Better land since 1994?   0.3  1.8 0.546  0.07
NEHAWU –0.55 –2.1 0.084 –0.15
NUMSA  0.42  2.1 0.238  0.08
Mean dependent variable: 0.7982. Observations: 441. Chi-squared: 120.2.
Log likelihood (LL): -161.7. Restricted LL: -121.8.
With regard to male union members, a significantly higher number, 
80%, intended voting ANC. The similarity across language with female 
union members indicates a possible racial rupture, except to a greater extent. 
This is indicated not just by Afrikaans and English speakers being 51 and 
54% less likely to support the ANC than those who speak Isixhosa, but 
also those who speak Isizulu being 15% less likely. Those union members 
that are employed as supervisors are also less likely to vote for the ANC 
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than unskilled workers (22%); this would reflect the partial persistence 
of a racial division of labour. The election of a shop steward in the work-
place again positively affects the probability of union members voting for 
the ANC, increasing it by 25%. As with females, better access to housing 
increases the likelihood of voting ANC, with access to more land also 
positively affecting voting for the ANC. Again, an apparent division is 
found between different trade unions within COSATU and their apparent 
alliance with the ANC party. Male NUMSA members are more likely to 
vote for the ANC than CWIU members (the base group), whilst NEHAWU 
members are less likely to vote ANC. This is perhaps surprising given that 
the results from Table 4 indicated a possible divide between NUMSA and 
SACCAWU. Again, the same argument of NUMSA members not appearing 
to have a legitimate alternative to the ANC can explain some of this. Male 
members of NEHAWU, however, are clearly disillusioned with the ANC 
and alliance, and this is not completely unsurprising. Male workers from 
this union represent unskilled, blue-collared, largely public sector, workers 
(e.g., cleaners) as opposed to a large number of female workers who are 
mostly nurses/professionals. The male union members may be particularly 
disillusioned with the drift to neoliberalism, as this has translated into both 
a commitment to privatization and a greater “contracting-out” of unskilled 
support jobs. Again, there have been a number of highly conspicuous 
industrial disputes within the public sector (mostly involving blue-collar 
workers), which have done little to promote good relations between the 
ANC and the public sector rank-and-file.
DISCUSSION
This paper aimed to examine the extent to which there was a lack of 
trade union unity within COSATU. This was against the background of 
current debates regarding the presence of vertical and horizontal cleavages. 
In particular, these debates relate to the existence of a diverse membership 
and to criticisms, from both left and right, of COSATU’s current stance of 
“strategic engagement.”
The survey revealed that, in general, there were high levels of both 
vertical and horizontal solidarity. Workers seem generally supportive of the 
strategic choices the leadership has made in choosing to retain the  alliance 
with the ANC. There appears little divergence too in the likelihood of 
strike action amongst COSATU members. Exceptions exist though across 
gender and racial divides and—perhaps more worryingly—between unions 
within COSATU.
Some of the vertical and horizontal divisions that are visible seem to 
reflect the persistence of racial tensions, with more conservative non-African 
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members being critical of the Alliance. Another concern within COSATU 
relates to members of SACCAWU. Our findings indicate that members 
of this trade union, and in particular female members, were less likely to 
vote for the ANC in the 1999 elections. This represents a horizontal rupture 
between sectors, and the possibility of a vertical rupture between COSATU 
and the ANC if disillusionment with the ANC spreads within the union 
federation. At the regional level, a degree of ethnic division and distinct 
political traditions was found, with the possibility again of a horizontal 
rupture within COSATU regarding SACCAWU members in Gauteng. Such 
a rupture was also found in the degree of militancy towards strike action, 
with members of CWIU more likely than any other union to take industrial 
action. As noted earlier, this is possibly a reflection of disenchantment with 
relatively recently introduced centralized bargaining structures.
However, whilst some horizontal ruptures within COSATU appear to 
exist, the results indicate a large degree of unity, since many explanatory 
variables in the voting models drop out of the analysis. Of those that have 
been dropped due to insignificance, the majority indicate support for the 
ANC and tripartite alliance. This is confirmed in the findings that reveal 
that the bulk of labour friendly legislation and—albeit focused and par-
tial—improvements in public services (e.g. better housing and wages since 
1994) have ensured that both leadership and rank-and-file remain largely 
behind the Alliance.
Whilst the survey revealed that there was not a significant divide 
between the “struggle” and the “post-struggle” generations in terms of 
political allegiances (Wood 2002), there is little doubt that the continued 
economic domination of the white minority and recent memories of the 
struggle against apartheid still provide a powerful “glue” uniting black 
workers. The increasingly close ties—and periodic joint campaigns—
between COSATU and historically conservative white dominated unions 
would seem to indicate that future class solidarity could gradually erode 
racial differences. In short, despite internal pressures, COSATU has been 
able to maintain and develop existing horizontal and vertical linkages and 
this represents a cornerstone of union strength (Walsh 1994).
These ties can be ascribed to the persistence of high levels of mass 
mobilization and the persistence of an embedded culture of internal 
 democracy, making any existing networks more meaningful and effective. 
In turn, the high degree of mobilization represents a likely product of real 
material conditions: the persistence of high levels of social inequality, 
despite limited progress in some areas, limited opportunities for upward 
mobility, and the dominance of management by members from the ethnic 
white minority, whilst dramatic political changes would make a similar 
brookes-pages769.indd   785 2005-01-14   14:20:07
Process Black
786 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2004, VOL. 59, No 4
transformation of the economic arena appear more attainable. In other 
words, high levels of relative deprivation persist (Kelly 1998).
Finally, whilst the South African labour movement has been relatively 
successful both in maintaining membership in traditional areas of union 
activity in the private sector, and in taking advantage of the political reforms 
of the early 1990s to expand activities in the public sector (Wood and 
Psoulis 2001), it has failed to make significant inroads amongst  workers 
in temporary and insecure occupations, or to make any headway in the 
informal sector; as is the case with many other industrializing economies, 
the latter provides an increasing proportion of the overall number of jobs. 
The South African labour movement has traditionally had good relations 
with community based political structures; however, the relationships with 
the rapidly proliferating new grassroots organizations representing “socially 
excluded” groups remain informal and, often, uneasy (Desai 2002). Making 
headway in these areas is contingent on the forging of new solidarities, 
founded on the development of clear policy alternatives that are meaningful 
to both existing and new constituencies. Whilst an essential prerequisite for 
union effectiveness, the deepening of existing horizontal and vertical ties, 
and the use of tried-and-tested organizing strategies in traditional areas of 
activity are unlikely to resolve the new challenge of outreach beyond the 
formal workplace; the fortunes of organized labour are contingent not only 
on the strengthening of existing networks, but also on their expansion into 
previously-neglected areas.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING 
 SOLIDARITIES
What this article highlights is that whilst there are both centrifugal 
and centripetal tendencies within COSATU, the overwhelming pressures 
are towards unity. Moreover, the nature and extent of existing internal 
divisions seem due to a complex range of causes, including changes in the 
levels of bargaining, distinct regional political traditions, long-standing 
debates within and between unions regarding the advisability of ties with 
political parties and community organizations, and strains imposed through 
union mergers.
Whilst there is little doubt that unity is a foundation of strength, the 
relationship should be two-way. High levels of internal solidarity make for 
organizational effectiveness at both national and plant level, which, in turn, 
would make both membership and active participation more rewarding, 
even amongst members of historically marginalized groupings. COSATU’s 
success over the past 16 years has resulted in relatively high degrees of 
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confidence in the manner in which the federation is run, and the alliances 
it has entered into. In turn, this has led to continued union growth, even in 
areas such as the public sector, where, up until the late 1980s, independent 
unions were relatively weak. The challenge facing the federation now is to 
consolidate these gains, and actively draw in those categories of members 
that are still marginalized in key areas. This, however, not only depends on 
focused organizational interventions, but also on the articulation of viable 
policy alternatives which have broad appeal. The South African experience 
provides an inspiring example to unions elsewhere, but also highlights the 
persistence of distinct national institutional configurations and the impact 
of specific historical traditions, and underscores the importance of strategic 
choice and the ability to respond rapidly to changing external conditions.
The South African experience holds important lessons for organ-
ized labour worldwide: it underscores the importance of vertical and 
horizontal linkages as a basis for greater union effectiveness. The greatest 
strengths of the South African labour movement include a vibrant shop-
floor democracy, an ability to hold elected representatives to account, 
close linkages between individual unions, and the capacity to mobilize 
support for  collective action both in the workplace and in the community. 
Its weaknesses include  persistent divisions on gender and racial lines, and 
within some unions and regions; again, there is the ongoing challenge of 
deepening ties between leadership and rank and file in a rapidly changing 
political- economic  context. Whilst an emphasis on recruitment and mobi-
lization may help organized labour retain its presence in key firms and 
industries, it is unlikely to make union membership more attractive to those 
employed in the informal sector and in other highly peripheral occupations: 
the latter are of increasing importance in industrializing countries, yet there 
is little evidence that unions have developed new policies more closely 
suited to the needs of workers in these areas. The challenges facing unions 
in both the mature economies and the developing world include not only 
the ability to mobilize and organize, and reconstitute and deepen vertical 
and horizontal solidarity, but the development of clear policy alternatives 
that reflect the concerns both of existing members and constituencies, and 
the growing bodies of workers condemned to more marginal areas of the 
economy.
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RÉSUMÉ
Diversité et unité au sein du Congrès des syndicats sud-africains
Cet essai se veut une étude des liens horizontaux et verticaux à 
l’intérieur du mouvement ouvrier national, une étude basée sur une enquête 
auprès des membres des syndicats affiliés au Congrès des syndicats
sud-africains. 
Au cours des 25 dernières années, les syndicats ont fait face à des 
problèmes sérieux, sur le plan international, en cherchant à gérer les pres-
sions liées à la « mondialisation ». Bien qu’à l’intérieur des contextes 
nationaux, les syndicats n’aient pas connu des taux uniformes de déclin, 
la plupart d’entre-eux ont perdu des membres. Cependant, dans le cas de 
l’Afrique du Sud, au cours de cette même période, les syndicats ont connu 
une période de croissance et de consolidation. Ceci est dû à la participation 
du Congrès des syndicats à la résistance populaire au régime de l’apartheid, 
ce qui représentait à la fois un défi industriel dans le champ économique 
de l’apartheid et un défi politique, par le biais de cette alliance tripartite 
entre le Congrès des syndicats sud-africains, le Congrès national africain 
et le Parti communiste sud-africain, alors embryonnaire.
Depuis la chute de l’apartheid et avec la domination politique du 
Congrès national qui s’en est suivi en Afrique du Sud, on s’est posé des 
questions au sujet de la pertinence de l’implication soutenue du Congrès des 
syndicats dans l’Alliance. D’un côté, les critiques conservateurs, en alliant 
la logique Olsonian à la théorie économique néoclassique orthodoxe, ont 
dénoncé la capacité du Congrès des syndicats à nuire au marché du travail, 
en excluant les intrus du monde du travail et en créant une  pression sur les 
employeurs. D’un autre côté, les critiques de la gauche ont commencé à 
mettre en cause l’appui maintenu au Congrès national, étant donné l’agenda 
néolibéral du Congrès et étant donné que les politiques qui en découlent 
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ont un effet négatif sur les syndicats membres au sein du Congrès des 
syndicats. 
La présente recherche est basée sur une enquête à l’échelle nationale 
conduite en 1998 auprès de travailleurs de la base au sein des syndicats 
affiliés au Congrès des syndicats. Elle cherchait à vérifier dans quelle 
mesure il y avait une absence d’appui à la propension des syndicats à 
entreprendre une action industrielle (donnant ainsi raison à la critique con-
servatrice), ou s’il y avait des dissensions au niveau de l’appui à l’Alliance 
(donnant ainsi raison la critique de la gauche). L’échantillon utilisé était à 
paliers multiples, sur une base régionale, et il incluait 646 répondants. Pour 
apprécier de façon plus formelle le niveau d’intégration ou de ruptures au 
Congrès des syndicats, nous avons retenu la propension à entreprendre une 
activité de grève comme indicateur d’une solidarité horizontale et l’appui 
au Congrès national, à titre d’indicateur d’une solidarité verticale. Dans les 
deux cas, nous avons étudié les disparités de comportement d’une région, 
d’une occupation, du genre et d’un groupe racial à un autre. Après avoir 
maintenu ces facteurs sous contrôle, nous avons pu vérifier des hypothèses, 
en tenant compte de toute différence significative d’un syndicat à un autre 
touchant la probabilité d’une action industrielle et le niveau d’appui au 
Congrès national indiquant la présence de ruptures internes et externes 
respectivement. 
Les conclusions de l’étude montrent des niveaux élevés de solidarité 
chez les membres des syndicats : 68 % des répondants (420) avaient alors 
participé à une activité de grève à l’intérieur des quatre dernières années 
et l’appui à l’Alliance était considérable (75 %). Cependant, à l’intérieur 
de la grille de la solidarité, les modèles présentent une certaine diversité. 
L’appartenance à un syndicat en particulier et la présence d’un délégué 
d’atelier entretiennent une relation significative avec la probabilité qu’une 
activité de grève ait lieu, mais cette relation ne se vérifie pas dans le cas des 
facteurs région, langue, occupation et niveau d’éducation. En termes d’appui 
à l’Alliance, l’effectif d’un syndicat spécifique et la langue indiquent 
quelques divergences, mais la région ne le fait pas.
De façon globale, l’étude permet de constater la présence de niveaux 
élevés de solidarité verticale et horizontale au sein du Congrès des syndicats 
sud-africains. Les travailleurs semblent appuyer les stratégies retenues par 
leurs dirigeants dans le sens du maintien d’une alliance avec le Congrès 
national. De plus, on observe peu de divergences quant à la probabilité d’une 
activité de grève chez les membres du Congrès des syndicats sud- africains. 
Des exceptions persistent, cependant, au passage du genre à l’autre, d’une 
race à une autre, et peut-être, ce qui semble plus inquiétant, entre les 
 syndicats mêmes du Congrès des syndicats sud-africains.
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